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Free Movement of Persons in The European Union, National Borders and
Legal Reforms: The Principle of Non-Discrimination
Based On Nationality (Article 12 ECT)
Dr. Ana Salinas de Frias*
A central feature of the European Union (EU) project which seeks
"integration" at the Community level, is the idea that productive factors within
an economy should enjoy the right of free movement. Persons, are productive
factors and as such, are recipients of this right. The idea is unique within the
EU where, unlike other regional associations, control of the workforce has long
been guaranteed to workers.
The economic objective of free movement of workers is to create a
common market workforce. The political objective, according to the Preamble
and Principles of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter
the ECT), is to strengthen the cohesion among the people of the EU by
eliminating barriers to migration and through the promotion of-citizenship
within the Union. These two objectives are clearly supported by the principle of
non-discrimination based upon the worker's nationality, which is one of the few
principles within the treaties that expressly establishes civil rights. It is perhaps
this reason that explains why this principle is so often invoked before the
Community's highest jurisdictional institution, either in tandem with other
complaints or as the sole cause of action. EU law expressly prohibits, within
Community territory, the application, of different criteria for Community
citizens, in similar situations where nationality is the only objective difference
between them. This prohibition, already vaguely contemplated by the
constituent Treaties, has been progressively amplified and specified through the
case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
Prohibition of discrimination is a classic prohibition in the
international instruments for the protection of human rights, 1 as well as in the
post World War II European constitutional texts. With the European
Community's, main objective being economic, then political integration, the
concept of discrimination acquires very specific and characteristic features.
Considered as a fundamental principle, constituent Treaties have consecrated
many provisions to this principle and have continued to develop its different
aspects over time. Simultaneously, the functionalism of the principle has been
invoked, as Article 12 ECT restricts its operational capacity to the sphere of said
Treaty. This functionalism, with its submission to fundamental human rights
and to the objectives of the Treaties, has restricted its reach. However, it has not
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weakened this principle within the Community's borders, and perhaps it has
proven even more efficient than the drafters of the provision had expected.
In Community law, non-discrimination is stronger than a general
prohibition of arbitrariness, since this prohibition would not be sufficient to
ensure the whole integration postulated by the Treaties. 2  However, the
reference to the general principle of prohibition of discrimination varies in
intensity throughout the Treaty of Rome. 3 In some cases, and as can be
deduced from Articles 30 and 31 ECT, this principle is reffered to as a
necessary condition for the existence of the Common Market. In other cases, the
principle has a more generic meaning, in that the only malice intended to be
avoided is an arbitrary difference in treatment of workers which has no other
effects. Such is the case with regards to Article 34.2 ECT, and the prohibition
of discrimination between producers and consumers in the agricultural market.
Likewise, the same meaning can be inferred from Article 82 ECT. as it proposes
to reduce competition due to the concentration of companies and to the abuse of
dominant positions within the market.
As for the general formulation of this principle, contained in Article
34.2 ECT, the Court has repeatedly stated that it is a specific expression of the
general principle of equality, which is part of the fundamental principles of
Community law. The Court has also stated that the principle of non-
discrimination stands for the proposition that similar situations are not dealt
with in different ways, unless the difference is objectively justified.4 However,
the Court has also pointed out that this Community concept of discrimination
does not prohibit disparities between the legislation of the different member
states. Nonetheless it is forbidden for each member state to apply its own laws
in different ways based upon the nationality of the interested parties.
Community law does not consider possible differences of treatment and
distortions that may derive from the differences in the legislation of the member
states, provided that these norms affect all natural and legal persons under its
area of application and that they are in accordance with objective criteria that
does not include either nationality 5 or any possible clashes between a
transposed Community law and the domestic legal system. 6
2 See Pinero Rodriguez Et Al., Igualdad y Discrimination 135 (1986).
.1 See A. Bleckmann, Considerations sur L' Interpretation de L' Article 7 du Traite
CEE 469-81 (1976); F. Shockwiler, La Portee du Principe de Non-Discrimination de L'Article
7 du Traite CEE 3-24 (1991).
4 See Case 245/81, EdekaZentrale Ag v. Germany, 1982 E.C.R. 2754; Joined Cases
117/76 and 16/77, Ruckdeschel v. Hauptzollant Hamburggt. Annen 1977 E.C.R. 1753, [1979]
2 C.M.L.R. 445 (1979); Joined Cases 124/76 and 20/77 Huileries Ponti-Mousson v. Office
National Interprofessional des Cereales, 1977 E.C.R. 1811, [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 445 (1979).
<<(>>This criteria will be held by ECJ also in the sphere of economic dispositions of ECT, in
the sphere of property rights and in the sphere of Community civil servants, a field where we
can find a great deal of examples).
5 See Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 16, [1969]
C.M.L.R. 100 (1969); Joined Cases 185-204/78, Van Dam en Zonen, 1979 E.C.R. 2361, [1980]
I C.M.L.R. 350 (1980); Case C-177/94, Perfili, 1996 E.C R 1-175-76.
6 See Joined Cases 81, 82 & 146/79, Sorasio-Allo & al. v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R.
2329, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 91 (1982). (The ECJ will not consider as a discrimination those
differences of treatment derived for natural phenomena, only those differences of treatment
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A. Prohibition of Discrimination based on Nationality and Free
Movement of Workers (Articles 39 and Beyond).
It is, in the case of the movement of a worker from a member state
within the Community, that equal treatment of Community nationals is most
clearly verifiable. From the point of view of fundamental rights, we should
determine the type of discriminations that exists and the treatment they receive
from the Court's case law, which seems to show a clear movement from an
initial economic fundamental freedom 7 to a real bundle of fundamental rights. 8
That is why freedom of movement will be restrictively interpreted only in
exceptional circumstances. 9 The community legal system shall protect the
fundamental freedom of all workers, regardless of their value as productive
factors. These freedoms include the freedom to move within the Community
under the same conditions as the nationals of the Member State where they are;
the freedom to accept offers of employment; and the freedom to stay in a
member state during the period of employment and afterwards once
employment ends. The idea of the "general principle of equal treatment (general
prohibition of discrimination) fundamental freedom of movement within the
Community" becomes a central element in the case law about fundamental
rights.
Article 39.2 ECT states that the "freedom of movement shall entail the
abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the
member states as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of
work and employment." However, the Treaty establishes four important
limitations to this freedom: public policy, public security, public health
concerns and employment in tho public service. According to this basic
regulation, the ECJ has generically defined this prohibition in the sphere of
freedom of movement as a specific expression of one of the fundamental
principles of Community law. This principle requires that similar situations
derived from human activities, especially those adopted by public authorities, will be
considered as discriminatory).
7 See Case 246/80 Broekmeulen v. Husarts Registratie Commissie, 1981 E.C.R. 2329,
[1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 91 (1982).
8 See Case 131/85, Emir Cul v. Regierungsparasident Dusseldorf, 1986 E.C.R. 1588,
[1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 501 (1987); Case 222/86, UNECTEF v. Heylens, 1987 E.C.R. 4117, [1989]
1 C.M.L.R. 901 (1989); Case 139/85, Kempfv. Staatssecretaris van Justice, 1986 E.C.R. 1471,
[1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 764 (1987); Case 29289, R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte
Antonissen, 1991 E.C.R. 1-777, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 373 (1991);see Esther Johnson & David
O'Keefe, From Discrimination to Obstacles to Free Movement: Recent Developments
Concerning the Free Movement of Workers 1989-1994, 31 C.M.L. Rev. 1313 (1994).
Bibliography related to free movement of workers is enormous, so it is only possible to quote
some indicative references. Anyway, for a comprehensive analysissee V. Abellan Honrubia,
La libertad de circulaci6n de trabajadores, Tratado de Derecho Comunitario Europeo. Estudio
sistemdtico desde el Derecho espafiol. Madrid, vol. 1I, 99 1986. P. Jimenez de Parga Maseda,
El derecho a la libre circulaci6n de las personas fisicas en la Europa comunitaria, Madrid,
1994. See G.F. Mancini, La circulaci6n de los trabajadores por cuenta ajena en ]ajurisprudencia comunitaria, within D.J. Linan Nogueras & G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias, El Derecho
comunitario europeo y su aplicaci6 judicial. Madrid, 805 1993 (For more recent
developments).
9 See E. Cerexhe, L'6galitd de traitement dans l'ordre juridique communautaire, in
Mdlanges offerts A Pierre-Henri Teigten Paris, 34 1984.
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shall not be dealt in different ways, unless the difference is objectively
justified.1 0 However, the absolute and unconditional character of the principle
of non-discrimination and the free movement of workers has been confirmed by
the Court I I and prevails over the actions of public authorities, but also over any
type of regulation which intends to regulate collective bargining. 12 The kind of
activity protected by the aforementioned principle presents an extremely wide
link: it is only necessary that the activity is considered as a provision of
wage earning work or a provision of remunerated service. The precise nature of
the legal link by which these services are satisfied is indifferent. The principle
of non-discrimination equally affects both work or services provisions. 13
It is also a principle with an indisputable direct effect, and thus a
generator of immediate civil rights. The ECJ, stated as much when it held that
not only did the Article 39 ECT fundamental principle of free movement of
workers have a direct effect and establishes individual rights that the respective
national jurisdictions must respect, but also that the derived Community
regulation adopted with regards to the limitations to that fundamental freedom
-Directive 64/221-is also immediately applicable. 14  However, disparity
between national legislations does not mean discriminatory treatment, since
they affect all persons within their jurisdiction, regardless of their nationality. 15
Section three of Article 39 ECT thus states, in unrestrictive terms, that
some specific rights enjoyed by nationals of the member states regarding free
movement of workers, including their right to move freely within the territory of
the other member states and to stay there for the purpose of employment. 16
Thus, discrimination, both direct and indirect based on nationality, is
prohibited. 17  One form of prohibited discrimination is, the hiriing of
10 See Case 147/79, Hochstrass v. ECJ, 1980 E.C.R. 3019, [1981] 2 C.M.L R586
(1981), Case 810-79, Uberschar v. Bundesversicherungasanstalt fur Angestellte, 1980 E.C.R
2753.
11 See Case 167/73, Commission v. French Republic, 1974 E.C.R. 1347, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 216 (1974); see Trevor C. Hartley, Direct Applicability and the Failure to Repeal
Incompatible National Legislation,1 Eur. L. Rev. 53 (1976);see also E. Cerexhe, L'dgalitd de
traitement dans rordre juridique communautaire, inMdlanges offerts A Pierre-Henri Teigten
Paris, 35 1984.
1" See Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Intemationale,
1974 E.C.R. 1405, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 320 (1975); Case 13/76, Dona v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R.
1339, [197612 C.M.L.R. 578 (1976).
" See Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Intemationale, 1974
E.C.R. at 1418.
14 See Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1347, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. I
(1975): Case 118/75, Watson and Belmann, 1978 E.C.R. 1197; Case 1/78, Kenny v. Insurance
Officer, 1978 E.C.R. 1497, [197813 C.M.L.R. 651 (1978);see Derrick Wyatt, Alien's Duty to
Notify National Authorities of his Presencel Eur. L. Rev. 556 (1976);see comments to Van
Duyn decision by TOMUSCHAT, Ch. L'ordre public, menace pour la libre circulation?. XI
CDE, 1975, p. 302-309; TOMUSCHAT, Ch.Le principe de proportionnalitd: Quis iudicabit?
L'affaire Watson. CDE, 1977, p. 97-102.
Is See Case 1/78, Kenny v. Insurance Officer, 1978 E.C.R. at 1498.
16 See Case 292/89, R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Antonissen, 1991
E.C.R at 1-777.
17 See Case 41/84, Pinna v. Caisse D'alocations Familiales de la Savoie, 1986 E.C.R.
I, [988] 1 C.M.L.R. 350 91988); Case 33/88, Allue and Coonan v. University of Venice, 1989
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professors who are nationals of other member states, as foreign language
assistants for only one year. This is justified by citing a temporary needs of the
contracting universityl 8or by arguing for the need to raise the level of
knowledge, at the university. This of course favors the relation with the
member state whose language is taught, where as the one year limit does not
apply to the professors who are citizens of that State.19 Another form of this
type of discrimination occurs with the establishment of higher employer
contributions to social security for contract workers that studied in another
Member State, than for those workers who have studied within that State.20
Additionally, another example involves the non-application of a favorable
provision, applicable to all national workers in general, to a worker of another
Member State, that would mitigate the negative effects derived from the absence
of the said worker from his job because of compulsory military service. When
that worker is obliged to fulfill the same obligation in his State of origin, the
discrimination is prohibited.2 1
As for the sphere of material ard territorial application of this
prohibition, it extends to all legal relationships that can be located within the
Community's territory, either considering the place where they are established
or where they produce their effects.2 2 Moreover, its application involves not
only avoiding an unfavorable treatment or a negative conduct, but also the
application, to migrant Community nationals who are carrying out a labor
activity2 3 in that State, or any favorable regulation or advantages applicable to
the nationals of the Member State.
(a) The Scope of Personal Application of the Prohibition of Non-
discrimination and its case Law Extensions
Article 39 ECT seems to define clearly the sphere scope of application
of the prohibition of discrimination based on nationality. However, derived
Community law on this subject has complicated this subject, shading the initial
profiles of the beneficiaries, which have been considerably amplified by the
ECJ case law.
The principle of free movement established in Article 39.2 refers to
"the workers" as the beneficiaries. This principle, according to Article 39.3 and
to case law, entails the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality
E.C.R. 1610; Case 111/91, Commission v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 1993 E.C.R. B17;
Joined Cases C-259/91, C-331/91 and C-332/91, Allue and Others v. Universita degli Studi de
Venezia and Universita degli Studi di Parma, 1993 E.C.R. 14309; Case C 4.19/92, Scholz v.
Opera Universitaria di Cagliari and Porcedda, 1994 E.C.R. 1521.
18 See Case 33/88, Allue and Coonan v. University of Venice, 1989 E.C.R. at 1610.
19 See Case C-272/92, Spotti v. Bayem, 1993 E.C.R. 5207.
.,0 See Case 27/91, URSSAF v. Hostellerie La Manoir Sarl, Aix-lesBains, 1991 E.C.R.
5542.
21 See Case 15/69, Wurttembergische Milchverwertung-SudmilchAG v. Ugliola, 1969
E.C.R. 369-70, [1970] C.M.L.R. 194 (1970).
2, See Case 36/74, Walrave and Kpch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale,
1974 E.C.R. at 1421; see Prodest v. Caisee Primaire d'Assurance Maladie de Paris, 1984
E.C.R. 3161.
2 See Case 15/69, Wurttembergische Milchvertung-Sudmilch-AG v. Ugliola, 1969
E.C.R. at 363-70.
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between workers of the member states regarding employment, remuneration and
other conditions of work and employment. The principle entails the right of EU
nationals--subject to public policy, security, health, and to employement offer
limitations--to move freely within the territory of member states for this
purpose, to remain in a Member State for employment purposes and to remain
in the territory of a member state until the conclusion of their employment. 24
Of course, in this definition found in the Treaty the concept of worker, the main
beneficiary of the right, has to be understood strictly according to Community
parameters. Since the Court considers free movement of EU workers as a
fundamental principle of Community law, we have to deal with a Community
concept of worker,2 5 and both the notion of salaried activity and the notion of
worker in the context of Article 39.2 ECT. This article cannot be restrictively
interpreted, because both parameters define the scope of application of one of
the fundamental human rights guaranteed by the Treaty. 26 In addition, this
concept has to be defined following the oblective criteria that constitutes the
working relationship, the main characteristic of which consists of -a person that
fulfills, for a certain period of time, in favor of others and under their direction.
a series of provisions, in consideration of a remuneration. ",27 This Community
concept of working relationship, coupled together with the Community idea of
worker, gives the migrant worker the same tax and social advantages as any
other national worker.2 8
From the beginning, the ECJ has interpreted the concept of worker
broadly. Furthermore, this concept incorporates all those EU nationals who
have moved to another Member State in order to carry out a salaried work. even
if it is only a part-time job or if, the remuneration obtained with that activity is
lower than national minimum wage. 29 Therefore. the restrictions that Member
States may impose upon EU workers are strictly limited: every person carrying
out an actual employment activity-except those activities carried out in such a
little scale as to be considered marginal and accessory-will be considered a
worker. Consequently, Member States cannot unilaterally subordinate the
social advantages established by Article 7.2 of Regulation 1612/68 to a
minimum period of professional activity. For this reason, a national from a
Member State who moves to another EU member state in order to complete a
series of studies is also considered a Community worker.3 0
,.4 See Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justice, 1982 E.C.R. 1047-48, [1982]
2 C.M.L R. 454 (1982); see Case 292/89, R. v. Immigration Appeal Trbunal ex parte
Antonissen, 1991 E.C.R. AT 1-777.
23 See Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justice, 1982 E.C.R at 1048.
26 See Case 44/65, Knappschaft v. Maison Singer et Fils, 1965 E.C.R. 965, [1966]
C.M.L.R. 82 (1966); Case 53/81, Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justice. 1982 E.C R. at 1049;
Case 66/85, Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Wurnemberg, 1986 E.C.R. 2144, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R.
389.
27 See Case 66/85, Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg. 1986 E.C.R. at 2144;
see Case 33/88, Allue and Coonan v. University of Venice. 1989 E.C.R at 1600.
,.8 See Case 65/8 1, Reina v. Landeskreditbank BadenWurttemberg, 1982 E.C.R. 44.
29 See Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justice, 1982 E.C.R. at 1050.
30 See Case 197/86, Brown v. Secretary of State for Sotland. 1988 E C.R. 3244,
[1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 403 (1988).
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This right can be considered within two different approaches. First, it
can be a passive approach, consisting of prohibitions restricting the entry of
nationals from other EU countries. Secondly, it can be considered from an
active approach because under this effect, individuals gain rights which require
a positive action from the host state, who must adopt measures to protect EU
nationals. The benefit to the EU is across the board uniformity.3 1 Every
document favoring the entry or settlement of an EU worker within a member
State has also been interpreted in the broadest terms. Thus, it is not possible for
the authorities of a member state to consider an EU national as an alien.
Therefore, neither he nor his children 32 can be asked for an entry or residence
permit or any other additional33 document. The entry document has just a
declarative value, not a constitutive34 one. Thus, we can deduce a double
consequence from this fact. First, Member States are obliged to issue that
document to every Community national meeting all the requirements of the
Community law.35 Member states do not have discretionary power over EU
nationals-a power that they have in regards to nationals of non-EU
countries. 3 6 Nonetheless, national authorities have the power to control those
requirements, but they cannot, in the event an EU national failes to meet them,
impose a decision of expulsion or imprisonment.3 7 Thus the right to family
reunification under Regualtion 1612/68-which allows the worker's family to
follow the worker to the member state's territory has expanded the personal
sphere scope of the right to free movement of workers.
The ECJ has demonstrated a restrictive attitude towards family
members, who are beneficiaries of this right. This restrictive attitude has been
shown with the adoption of relative in charge or of son under 21 years old
restrictions. Nonetheless, the inclusion of relatives in charge, beneficiaries of
these rights, of sons over 21 years old but still not emancipated, is actually not
that specific. Regarding non-married couples, the Court has not accepted a
31 See Case 118/75, Watson and Belmann, 1976 E.C.R. at 1197.
32 See Joined Cases 389 and 390/8, Echtemach and Moritz v. Netherlands Minister for
Education and Science, 1989 E.C.R. 769.
33 See Case 157/79, Regina v. Pieck, 1980 E.C.R. 2185 Case 321187,reaffirmed in
Commission v. Belgium, 1989 E.C.R. 997. Since the freedom of establishment is also a part of
the freedom of movement of Community workers, a Community national shall not be asked for
the affiliation to a national social security regime to allow him/her to reside within that
Member State; see also Case 363/89, Roux v. Belgian State, 1991 E.C.R. 1290. He/she will
neither be obliged, before the entry in the territory, to answer questions related to the objective
and long of his/her travel, as well as to the economic means he/she has.See also Case 68/89,
Commission v. Netherlands, 1991 E.C.R. 2656.
.4 See Case 8/77, Sagulo et al., 1977 E.C.R. 1505; seealso Case 48/75, Royer, 1976
E.C.R. 513; see also Case 157/79 Regina v. Pieck, 1980 E.C.R. at 2186;see also European
Commission v. Belgium 1989 E.C.R. at 1010. In the same way, the Court will assert that the
identity card shown by the migrant worker is just to show its identity and natioanalitgee also
Case 376/89, Giagounidis v. Reutlingen, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1092$ee also Roux v. Belgium, 1991
E.C.R. at 1-293.
35 See Case 48/75, Royer, 1976 E.C.R. at 497.
3 See Case 8/77, Sagulo et al., 1977 E.C.R. at 1504; Case 157/79 Regina v. Pieck,
1980 E.C.R. at 2184-2185.
37 See Case 118/75, Watson and Belmann, 1978 E.C.R. at 1198; Case 48/75, Royer,
1976 E.C.R. at 514-515; Case 157/79 Regina v. Pieck, 1980 E.C.R. at 2187.
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regulation interpreting non-married couples, whose derived rights are still not
recognized. 38 In contrast, married couples-even if the couple is separated-
enjoys those rights, since the marital link remains 3 9 as far as the divorce
resolution is not finalized.4 0 Age and economic dependence limitations do not
affect, however, the right of Community worker's children to receive education,
as well as scholarships or grants to complete those studies.4 1 However, despite
this broad concept of worker, those workers who have never moved from the
State which they are nationals of in order to accept offers of employment
actually made or to search for employment, are not beneficiaries of these rights,
and the Court classifies such cases as "mere domestic situations."'42
Regarding the territorial sphere scope of application, the Court has
maintained--in addition to the extensive conception ratione materiae of this
right-that the non-discrimination principle must be imposed on all legal
relationships, in so far as these relationships can be placed within the
Community's territory, either because: a) of the place where they are set: or b)
of the place where they manufacture their goods.4 3  Even if these legal
relationships are carried out outside the Community's territory, this principle
would be applied even if the work relationship has a strong linkage with the
territory of a Member State.44
(b) The Content of the Concept of Social Advantage and its Derived
Rights
Article 7.2 of Regulation 1612/68 establishes, as a fundamental right
derived from the free movement of persons, the right of EU migrant workers to
enjoy the same tax and social advantages as any national worker of the State
where the Community worker has moved too. This broadly recognized right.
has been progressively delimited by ECJ.
As a basis criterion, the Court starts with a wide concept of social
advantage. Its scope of application must include all social and tax advantages-
no matter if they are bound or not to a work contract-generally recognized to
18 See Case 59/85, Netherlands v. Reed, 1986 E.C.R. 13001301.
19 See Case 26/783, Diatta v. Berlin, 1985 E.C.R. 589-590. (These derived rights, in
favor of the rest of beneficiaries due to their status of migrant worker's close family, are
considered as fundamental rights).
40 See Case 170/90, The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, 1992 E.C.R 1-4294-
95.
41 See Case 7/94, Landesamtfur Ausbildungsforderung Nordrheim-Westfalen v. Lubor
Gaal, 1995 E.C.R. 1-1049.
42 See Case 175/78, La Reine v. Saunders, 1979 E.C.R. 1 135;see also Joint Cases 35
and 36/82, Morson v. Netherlands and Sweradjie Jhanjan v. Netherlands, 1982 E.C.R. 3736;
see also Case 332/90, Volker Steen v. Deutsche Bundespost, 1992 E.C.R. 1357; see also Case
180/83, Hans Moser v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1984 E.C.R. 2547;see also Case 298/84,
lorio v. Azienda Autonama, 1986 E.C.R. 255;see also Joint Cases 330/90 and 331/90, Angel
L6pez Brea and Carlos Hidalgo Palacios, 1992 E.C.R. 1336; see also Case 60/91. Batista
Morais, 1992 E.C.R. 2105; see also Case 299/95, Kremzow v. Rebublik Osterreich, 1997
E.C.R. par. 13.
4' See Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Intemationale,
1974 E.C.R.at 1421.




all national workers for their worker condition or just for residing within the
national territory, as well as those advantages whose extension to all
Community workers will favor their mobility.4 5 This includes not only
benefits granted as rights, but also those benefits granted on a discretionary
basis. The Principle of equal treatment requires benefits (including the granting
of bank credits) 4 6-be accesible under the same conditions, both for the State's
nationals and for those nationals of other member states. Member states cannot
combine the concession of social advantages, established by a regulation, to a
minimum period of professional activity. 47 The principle includes the right of
the migrant worker's children to: a)attend basic or professional studies; to
receive economic aid or a grant; b)to attend those studies under the same
conditions as that Member state's nationals,4 8 or c)to attend professional
advanced studies in another Member State,49 even if it is the State of which the
migrant worker's child is a national. 50 The admission of an EU migrant
worker's child in primary education under the same conditions as that Member
State nationals includes enrollment conditions, as well as the whole of situations
derived from enrollment51 and, in general, every measure aimed to facilitate
attendance to courses.52  Moreover, this concept of education has been
broadened to the extent that it does not only include basic and professional
courses, but also university education. 53
According to the delimitation made by the Court, the concept of social
advantage also includes the right of a handicapped child over 21 years of age to
receive benefits derived from his parents worker status if the law of the Member
State where they carry out their labor activity grants so to its nationals. 54 It
also includes the right to get benefits from national measures for handicapped
social re-adaptation. 55 This right must be recognized to the migrant worker's
child even in the case of a minor handicapped child cannot become a
45 See Case 297/78, Gilbert Even and ONPTS, 1979 E.C.R. 2034;see also Case
315/94, Vos v. Stadt Bielefeld, 1996 E.C.R. 11440.
46 See Case 65/81 Reina v. Landeskreditbank BadenWurttemberg, 1982 E.C.R. at 45.
A wide interpretation of the content of the term social advantage that the Court holds in its
case-law. See Case 249/83, Vera Hoeckx, 1985 E.C.R. 988;see also Case 94/84, Joszef Deak,
1985 E.C.R. 1885-1886; see also Case 157/84, Maria Frascogna, 1985 E.C.R. 1749;see also
Case 39/86, Sylvie Lair, 1988 E.C.R. 3196-3197.
47 See Case 39/86 Sylvie Lair, 1988 E.C.R. at 3021.
48 See Case 9/74, Casagrande, 1974 E.C.R. 778779; see also Case 389 and 390/8
Echtemach and Moritz v. Netherlands Minister for Education and Science, 1989 E.C.R. at 764;
see also Case 308/89, di Leo, 1990 E.C.R. 14207.
49 See Case 39/86 Sylvie Lair, 1988 E.C.R. at 3197;see also Case 235/87, Matteucci,
1988 E.C.R. 5610.
5o See Case 308/89, di Leo, 1990 E.C.R. at 14209.
51 See Case68/74, Alaimo, 1975 E.C.R. 113.
52 See Joined Cases 389 and 390/8, Echternach and Moritz v. Netherlands Minister for
Education and Science, 1989 E.C.R. at764; see also Case 308/89 di Leo, 1990 E.C.R. at I-
4207; see also Case 7/94, LuborGaal, 1995 p.I1046-1047.
53 See Case 39/86 Sylvie Lair, 1988 E.C.R. at 3197-3198;see also Brown v. Secretary
of State for Scotland, 1988 E.C.R. 3244, 1988 3 C.M.L.R. 403 (1988);see also Joined Cases
389 and 390/8, Echtemach and Moritz v. Netherlands Minister for Education and Science,
1989 E.C.R. at 762-763.
54 See Case 63/76, Inzirillo, 1976 E.C.R. 2067-2068.
55 See Case 7672, Michel S., 1973 E.C.R. 463.
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Community worker when reaching majority of age, as a consequence of his/her
handicap.5 6 In the same way, it also includes the right of a migrant worker's
child to receive benefits as a young worker applicant, in the same conditions
established in the national law in favor of its own nationals.5 7 Another possible
content of social advantage is the right, for a migrant worker's ascendant, to
receive a retirement pension granting a minimum income for them. That right
cannot be scrutinezed under residency requirements for a certain period of time
in the Member State, if that condition is not also applied to the nationals of that
member state.58 Furthermore, this concept of social advantage bestows the
right of a Community worker involved in a criminal procedure to have a hearing
in his/her own mother tongue,59 as well as the right of a migrant worker to
receive financial aid to pay burial expenses. 60 Finally, in these cases the ECJ
has remarked that the concept of social advantage is applied as a right derived
from the free movement of persons within the EU. but it cannot be applied in a
purely domestic situations. 6 1
(c) The Limitations on Grounds of Public Policy, Public Security and
Public Health.
As the free movement of persons enjoys the feature of being
considered as a fundamental Community right and it has a direct effect, free
movement of migrant workers can only be limited in those cases included in
Article 39.3: public policy, public security or public health. 6 2 But even in these
cases, the ECJ shall adopt a restrictive criterion: these circumstances 63 cannot
be freely set by Member States, but, as they suppose a limitation of special
importance for this process of consolidation, they must be set from a
Community point of view. Though the article includes three different
limitations, case law has mainly referred to public policy and public security,
and it has settled down its meanings and scopes, as well as the limitations and
the scopes of Council Directive 64/221.
A national authority shall use a restrictive measure for free movement
of persons on grounds of public policy if there is any problem related to social
order, that is, a violation of the national law, an actual threat serious enough to
affect a fundamental societal interest. 64  This reasoning, which will be
5 See Case 7/75, Mr & Mrs. F. v. Belgium State, 1975 E.C.R. 690.
57 See Case 94/84, Joszef Deak, 1985 E.C.R. at 1886;see also Case 278/94, European
Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium, 1996 E.C.R. 14339.
59 See Case 261/83, Castelli v. ONPTS, 1984 E.C.R. 3213-3214; see also Case
157/84, Maria Frascogna, 1985 E.C.R. at 1749.
59 See Case 137/84, Heinrich, 1985 E.C.R. 2695.
0o See Case 237/94, O'Flynn, 1996 E.C.R. .-2637.
See Case 298/84, lorio v. Azienda Autonoma, 1986 E.C.R. at 255.
62 See Case 67/74, Bonsignore, 1975 E C.R. 3175-3177. (The Advocate general
Mayras states in his conclusions in Bonsignore that "Ces droits ont un caract~re fondamental
dans le systme du traitd. Leur exercise ne peur etre limitd arbitrairement ou meme
dicrdtrionnairement par les ttats membres.").
63 See Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1347, 1 C.M.L.R. 1 (1975).
See also comments to this decision by TOMUSCHAT, L'orde public..., cit. supra, p. 302-310.
64 See Case 30/77, Regina v. Bouchereau, 1977 E.C.R. 2014.
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systematically repeated in subsequent cases, 65 sets up the substantive
jurisprudential issue by affirming that: the interpretation of these limitations has
to be restrictive ---to favor the development of the migrant worker's rights-and
should be shaped within the common framework of the Community. 66
Furthermore, since it is a limitation that refers to rights directly granted by
Community law, it imposes specific obligations to Member States.
Consequently, national jurisdictions must review any national measure that has
been adopted to that respect, regardless of wheather these measures were
adopted by laws, by regulations or if they are individual measures related to a
single worker.67 From this moment forward, the Court will establish the
conditions for these measures to be compatible with Community law.
In this case law, it is possible to make a distinction between
substantive conditions and formal requirements. Regarding the substantive
issues there are two main conditions. First, the ECJ has established that
restrictions will be necessarily based on the personal behavior of the worker
affected by the limitation. 6 8 Reasons based on general prevention criteria
cannot be considered to expel someone from the territory of a Community
Member State. Furthermore, if the requirements foreseen in the residence
Member State related to the entry and access of aliens6 9 are not met, that will
not be considered as a threat to public policy or security. Consequently, an
expulsion under these circumstances would not be compatible with the
Community legal system, as it would suppose the denial of the freedom of
movement. 7 0 The existence of previous criminal penalties,7 1 especially if
those penalties are imposed by a fact contrary to Community law
prescriptions-such as the requirement of a special document to allow a migrant
EU worker72 entry into a national territory-would not be compatible with the
Community legal system. On the other hand, according to Article 9.2 of
Council Directive 64/221/EEC, the national administrative authority cannot,
except in special emergency situations, make an expulsion decision of a EU
resident before the competent authority has given its decision.7 3 Regarding
65 See Case 36/75 Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219 1231; Case
30/77, Regina v. Bouchereau, 1977 E.C.R. at 2013. see Charles Tomuschat, La libre circulation
et le status politique des ressortissants communautabs, C.D.E. 58 1976; Trevor C. Hartley,
Public Policy and International Free Movement: a Critical Comment on the Rutili Decision, 1
Eur.L.Rev. 473 (1976). See also D. Simon, Ordre Public et Libertds Publiques dans les
Communautds Europdennes. R.M.C. 201 (1976).
66 See Case Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. at 1231.
67 See Case 36/75 Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. at 122%230.
68 See Case 41174, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. at 1352, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R.
I (1975); see Case 67/74, Bonsignore, 1975 E.C.R. at 307; Case 36/75 Rutili v. Minister for
the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. at 1235;see Case 30/77, Bouchereau, 1977 E.C.R. at 2009-10; Case
348/96, ReDonatella Calfa, 1999 All E.R. (EC) 850.
69 See Case 48/75, Royer, 1976 E.C.R at 515-516.
70 See Case 118175, Watson and Belmann, 1978 E.C.R. at 11981199.
71 See Case 30/77, Regina v. Bouchereau, 1977 E.C.R. at 2009-2010;ee Case 131/79,
Regina v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte Mario Santillo, 1980 E.C.R. 1601;
Case 348/96, Re Donatella Calla, 1999 All E.L (EC) at 850.
72 See Case 8/77, Sagulo et al., 1977 E.C.R. at 1505.
73 See Case 175/94, Gallagher, 1995 E.C.R. 14253, (In relation to the expulsion of an
Irish national from the British territory because he was suspected to be a IRA member).
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formal requirements, the Court has required that the communication to the
affected person of the restrictive measure adopted against him/her must be
motivated. This requirement intends to allow, a future appeal before the
authorities of that Member State,74 or at least to allow his/her defense, 75 and
additionally requires the immediate adoption, after having been
communicated, 76 of the decision.
As for the limitation on grounds of public morality, the same
requirements are applied. In every solved case, the plaintiff has practiced or is
suspected to have practiced prostitution. The expulsion of a Community
national from the territory of a Member State based on public morality must
respect the possibility of an appeal to that decision prior to its execution, in the
same conditions as would apply to the nationals of that State.7 7 In addition, the
method and manner of communicating the measure to the affected worker must
be directed toward him in a comprehensible manner, both in its content and
effects, in order to allow his/her defense. Another applicable requirement in this
situation is that the limitation to freedom of movement must be based on the
personal behavior of the person charged. If the reason for the expulsion is
prostitution and it is not legally forbidden to its own nationals, the practice of
that activity cannot be used to expel a migrant Community national. 78
Finally, public health limitation has been scarcely considered by ECJ
case law. In regards to this issue the Court has agreed with a restrictive
interpretation of this restriction, considering that the power of Member States to
limit free movement of persons on grounds of public health does not intend to
leave the public health sector-out of the sphere of application of the principles
of freedom of movement, rather it considers this sector as a global economic
sector and from the point of view of employment access. It intends to have the
capacity to deny the entry or stay within their territory to people whose entry or
stay in the State would pose a risk for public health.7 9 Recently the ECJ has
had the opportunity to talk about this limitation of free movement of persons
and of fundamental human rights. The Court has stated that:
competent authorities of Member States shall control, in favor of public
health protection, import of medicines used only under medical prescription
in the State of import. However, these controls should be established in a
74 See Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. at 1233; Case 48/75
Royer, 1976 E.C.R. at 517.
75 See Case 131/79, Regina v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte Mario
Santillo, 1980 E.C.R. 1600.
76, See Case 36/75 Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. at 1235, and Case
131/79, Regina v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte Mario Santillo. 1980 E.C.R. at
1601. (This exigency would not be fulfilled if the measure to be adopted, for example
expulsion, is applied some years after having been communicated).
77 See Case 98/79, Pecastaing v. Belgium State, 1980 E.C.R. 713.
79 See Joined Cases 115 and 116/81 and Adoui v. Belgian State and City of Leige,
Comuaille v. Belgian State, 1982E.C.R. 1665 1707-1708 and 1708-1709.
79 See case GfiI, cit. supra, p. 1589.
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way that they comply with the respect of fundamental rights as they have
been previously explained.8 0
(d) The Restriction of Free Movement of Workers on the Grounds of
Nationality within Public service employment.
According to one of the latest restriction of Article 39 of the ECT, some
types of labor activities may be excluded from the prohibition of discrimination
on grounds of nationality. Specifically, it concerns employment which is to be
carried out within the public sector of Member States.8 1 The Court has firmly
asserted that - considering the fundamental character of the principles of free
movement of persons and of equal treatment, repeals admitted by Article 39.4
cannot exceed the purposes that this clause was conceived for. The exception
contemplated by this provision, access to employment in the public sector, and
the nature of the legal link between the worker and the public service is
irrelevant.8 2 This exception excludes from the possible sphere of application of
Article 39 of the ECT a series of jobs involving any degree of participation,
direct or indirect, in functions "which are characteristics of specific public
service activities, as long as they involve some public power and responsibility
in the safeguard of the general interests of the State, and they suppose, on their
holders' side, the existence of a particular relationship of solidarity with the
State, as well as reciprocity in rights and duties on which the link of nationality
relies."8 3 Excluded employment are only those that, considering its inherent
tasks and responsibilities, may have those characteristics. That is the reason
why, for example, teachers,8 4 nurses at State hospitals, captains and deputy
captains of merchant navy, 8 5 national research institute workers, 86 foreign
language assistants at a university8 7 or employment in public sectors such as
go See Case 62/90, European Commission v. Germany, 1992 ECR 1-2609. (The
possibility for a migrant worker to introduce with him/her, in the Member States, medicines for
his/her personal use).
81 See D. Lopez Garrido, El acceso a la funci6n pOblica en la Europa de los Doce35
R.V.A.P. 131, 137 (1993);see J.L. Moreno Perez, La libre circulaci6n de trabajadores en las
Administraciones Piiblicas de los paises comunitarios, R.L. 438 (1994); J.L. Moreno Perez, La
condici6n de nacionalidad en el acceso a los empleos pfblicos, 1991.& See Case 152/73, Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost, 1974 E.C.R. 162-163.
8 See Case 149/79, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of
Belgium, 1980 EC.R. 3901.
F See Case 66/85, Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1986 E.C.R. at 2147;
see Case 473/93, European Commission v. Luxembourg, 1996 E.C.R. 13257-58.8 See Case 307/84, EC Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 1725; Case 37/93,
European Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6295.
86 See Case 225/85, EC Commission v. Italian Republic, 1987 E.C.R. 2625.
87 See Case 66/85, Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1986 E.C.R. at 2147;
Case 33/88, Allue and Coonan v. University of Venice, 1989 E.C.R. 1609 ee also Case 4/91,
Bleis v. Ministtere de l'Education Nationale, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5640-5641. (However, as local
legislative measure, that measure under which a teaching institution required applying teachers
the passing of an exam of the language of that State, would not be discriminatory, even if that
language is minority and it is not very used.)see also Case 379/87, Groener v. Minister for
Education and City of Dublin Vocational Education Committee, 1989 E.C.R. 3993.
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postal service, rail transport or supply of water, gas, electricity, orchestras 8 8 or
private security services, 89 are not excluded.
B. Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality and
Freedom of Establishment (Article 43 TEEC).
Another of the important freedoms of the initially called "Common
Market" was the freedom of establishment of enterprises and professionals in
any of the signatory Member States, thereby favoring the economic flow.
Freedom of establishment aims to improve integration in the sphere of
non salaried activities. This freedom will also be subject to many claims before
the ECJ: a straight connection is evident with the principle of non-
discrimination for reason of nationality from the moment that it implies the
movement of its beneficiaries throughout the territory of the Communitty. 9 0
As for the freedom of establishment and the prohibition to discriminate
by reason of nationality--foreseen in the old Article 53 of the ECT (presently
repealed) and now included in article 43 ECT--the Court had already established
the direct effect of this provision, an effect that cannot be denied by an non-
existent or incomplete transposition of directives set to comply with this
right.9 1 Also in this case, there must be a wide interpretation of who the
beneficiaries are: the nationals of all Member States, without discrimination by
reason of residence or nationality.9 2 However, also in this sphere there is also a
clear limitation since freedom of establishment cannot be applied to purely
domestic situations that have no relation to Community law. 93 Moreover, this
right does not need a national legislative action to be applicable, since it can be
implemented at a national level through constitutional principles, if they are
clear and accurate enough to individualize situations and beneficiaries. But it
cannot be admitted that national authorities have a discretionary power of
interpretation in the validation of degrees and diplomas, as there is an automatic
equivalencey tfor hem under a Community directive. 94 The requirement to
posses a national diploma is considered per se discriminatory.9 5
88 See Case 173/94, European Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium, 1996 E.C.R. I-
3282.
89 See Case 114/97, European Commission v. Spain [1988].
90 See I. Hiniesta Borrajo, "Las libertades de establecimiento y servicios", in Tratados
de Derecho Comuniario Europeo. Estudio sistemdtico desde el Derecho Espahol, vol. 11. 149.
(However, this study offers a case-law approach to the freedom of establishment and services,
strictly from the fundamental rights point of view, so it is related since the beginning to the
principle of non discrimination. Regarding this subject,see V. Abellan Honrubia, "La
contribuci6n de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de las Comunidades Europeas a la
realizaci6n del derecho de establecimento y la libre prestaci6n de servicios", in D.J. Lifqan
Nogueras, El Derecho comunitario Europeo y su aplicaci6n judicial, Madrid, 1993, 771.
91 See Case 271/82, Auer v. Ministere Public, 1983 E.C.R. 2744; Case 5/83, Criminal
Porceedings against Rienks, 1983 E.C.R. 4245; Case 107/83, Paris v. Klopp, 1984 E.C.R. 2987.
92. See Case 115/78, Knoors v. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1979 E.C.R.
409 (for plumbers); Case 61/89, Criminal Proceedings against Bouchoucha, 1990 E.C.R. 2029,
(for the massager, osteopath and naturopath).
93 See Joined Cases 54/88, 91/88 and 14/89, Nino et al., 1990 E.C.R.-B549. See also
Case 152/94, van Buynder, still not published officially.
94 See Case 29/84, European Commission v. Germany, 1985 E.C.R. 1676.
93 See Case 71/76, Thieffiry v. Coseil de l'orde des Avocats a la Cour de Paris, 1977
E.C.R. 765. See Comments on this subject by D.M.W. Pickup, Reverse Discrimination and
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In this content, prohibition of discrimination by reason of nationality
consists of the non establishment of new measures submitting the setting up of
professionals from other States to a regulation more severe than the one
reserved to national professionals, no matter the legal regime of the
enterprise. 96 In the same way, if it is not discriminatory to request the
obligatory registration in the professional association to carry out a professional
activity,9 7 this would be discriminatory if the absence of registration is due to
the fact that the degrees presented are not validated, degrees that could be
validated under the directive for such subject.9 8 A national regulation is
allowed to establish different situations if it is not applied in function of the
economic operators' nationality and if it only takes into account the setting place
of the economic activities.9 9 Thus, that regulation or provision will not be
considered discriminatory even if it creates a situation affecting the competitive
capacity of the economic operators established in its territory in relation to
economic operators established in other Member States, if it makes no
difference, direct or indirectly, in nationality. 100  A national act whose
accomplishment is especially difficult for other Community nationals, both for
legal and physic persons, will neither be considered discriminatory if it is
applied in the same way to the nationals of that State. 10 1 So, for instance,
when recognizing the freedom of establishment of a lawyer, the fact that he/she
has another professional office in another Member State is not important. 10 2
As it is a fundamental freedom granted by the Treaty to Community nationals
and it has got a direct effect, 103 even those nationals who try to enforce it in
their own State get benefits from this freedom, if the professional skills entitling
to free establishment in that country have been acquired under this Community
freedom in another Member State. 10 4
ECJ has stood for an extensive interpretation of the concept of freedom
of establishment, and it has included in its interpretation not only freedom to
Freedom of Movement for Workes, 25 C.M.L.Rev. 135 (1986). A criterion that the Court will
later support in relation to the profession of architect and doctorSee Case 11/77, Hugh Patrick
v. Ministre des Affaires Culturelles, 1977 E.C.R. 1204; Case 246/80, Broekmeulen v. Huisarts
Registratie Commissie, 1981 E.C.R. 2329.
% See Case Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C., 1162.
97 See Case Auer v. Ministere Public and Order National des Veterinaires de France,
1983, E.C.R. 2727, 2744; Case Rienks, 1983 E.C.R. at 42454246; Case 292/86, Gullung v.
Conseil de I'ordre des Avocats du Barreau de Colmar et de Saveme, 1988 E.C.R. 111, 140.
99 See Case Auer v. Ministere Public and Order National des Veterinaires de France,
1983 E.C.R. at 2744; and case Rienks, 1983 E.C.R. at 4246.
9 See Case 31/78, Bussone v. Italian Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry, 1978
E.C.RI 2445.
10D See Case 155180, Summary Proceedings Against Sergius Oebel, 1981 E.C.R. 1981.
101 See Case 182/83, Fearon & Company Limited v. Irish Land Commission, 1984
E.C.R. 3677,3686-3687.
102 See Case 107/83 Orde des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Klopp, 1984 E.C.R. at
2989-2990.
103 See Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299.
i04 See Case 115/78 Knoors v. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1979 E.C.R. at
409.
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access to the activity, but also to its exercise in wide terms. 10 5 This extensive
interpretation is the beginning of the idea applied long before considering free
movement of workers as a fundamental right recognized by the Treaties. Now
that interpretation is applied to freedom of establishment of professionals, and it
is contrary to any restrictive interpretation of this right as well as of those
related to it. The Court will say that the exercise of a professional activity
involves for a person the right to access to a place where to put in practice
his/her activity, and (if necessary) the right to ask for a credit bank in order to
get a place for his/her activity, as well as the right to use them as housing. Due
to these reasons, restrictions contained in the normative on housing in the place
of work may suppose a barrier to freedom to provide services. Every restriction
on housing access or on different facilities that these nationals receive to release
their financial burden must be considered as a barrier to the exercise of the
professional activity. 106 The existence of a normative vacuum in a Member
State regarding the possible direct effect of this right and its possibility to be
invoked by Community nationals will also be considered discriminatory, as it
suppose a degree of uncertainty for those who are not nationals in a State. 10 7
In addition, administrative practices -which can be modified by Public Service
and which are not rightly published- cannot be considered to comply in a
valid way the obligations of the Treaty. 108
Case law in this subject has not referred very often to public policy,
public safety and public health limitations. It has neither referred to the
restrictions related to Public Service employment which, under article 45 ECT
are also applicable in the case of freedom of establishment. However, the Court
has stated that an extension of the exception allowed by article 45 ECT to the
whole of a profession could not be accepted, except if those activities were
linked in such a way that the freedom of establishment intended to compel the
interested Member State to allow the professional exercise, even occasional, by
no nationals, of public service activities. I 09 The feature of fundamental right,
enjoyed by freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services, has been
pointed out by the Court in the Heylens case, referred to the wish of a Belgian
national to provide his services as a football coach in France. The Court stated
that, as free access to employment is a fundamental right for any member of the
European Community, the existence of a jurisdictional way of appeal against
every decision of a national authority preventing the exercise of that right is
essential to grant the effective protection of the individual's right.I 10 This case
law has been reasserted afterwards by the ECJ in Vlassopoidout case, where it
has said that the examination of the equivalence between knowledge and
105 See Case 197/84, Steinhauser v. City of Biarritz, 1985 E.C.R. 1827.
106 See Case 63/86, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic,
1988 E.C.R. 29, 52-53.
107 See Case 38/87, Commission of the European Communities v. Helenic Republic,
1988 E.C.R. 4430 (Regarding the activities of professional and trainee journalists, advertisg
and professional activities related to tourism).
1o See Id. The Court continues with the criterion it defended against the same State in
case 168/85, Commission v. Helenic Republic, 1986 E.C.R. 2945.
I ) See Case 2/74 Reyners v. Belgium State, 1974 E.C.R. at 654-56.
11o See Case 222/86, UNECTEF v. Heylens, 1987 E.C.R. at 4117.
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attitudes proved by the foreign degree and those required by the normative of
the Member State must be made by national authorities following a procedure
according to the requirements ---related to the effective protection of
fundamental rights for every Community national- of Community law. So, all
the decisions made by national authorities, related to that examination, must be
liable to a judicial appeal allowing to check its legality in relation to
Community law and allowing the affected to know the reasons of the decision
made. 111
C. Citizenship of the Union: free movement of persons as civil right.
Citizenship of the Union, established in the Treaty on the European
Union (TEU), is also the result of a Community policy searching the approach
of the nationals of the different Member States. Traditionally, it has been
believed that the Europe of citizens should be built through the arousal of the
Community population, through the development of an authentic European
identity. 112 But the European identity depended on the arousal of the
population. So, it was established a policy of external symbols that showed the
belonging to the Community, and that consolidated that Community identity. In
this incipient citizenship where included a series of material elements: the
adoption of its own flag and anthem, of the same passport for all the
Community nationals, 113 of a common driving license.11 4 The aim was to
create a homogeneous European model for a series of formalities of daily life
that made easier the development of that identity; to create, through a series of
special rights conferred to Community nationals with a clear instrumental
nature, a citizenship in service of the Union. However, the Treaty of the
European Union overpasses this aim and creates an authentic status of citizen of
the Union that is completely different: the establishment of a Union in service of
the citizen. 115
The material sphere of that status is not homogeneous, but it entails
two kinds of elements. On one hand, a series of specific rights conferred to the
citizens. On the other hand, a series of specific means of protection that
supposes, despite its location, important differences with the aforementioned.
In the same way, the rights that the TEU recognizes for the Community citizens
are of different kinds. From this point of view, article 18 ECT embodies two
rights traditionally linked to the Community economic sphere and that,
consequently, are not of new creation. It is a constitutionalization of the acquis
communautaire in relation to freedom of movement and residence.
(a) Free movement and free residence rights
Article 18 ECT establishes:
See Case 340/89, Vlassopoulou v. Ministrerium fur Justiz, 1991 E.C.R. 2-357, 1-
2385.
112 See C.A. Stephanou, ldentitd et citoyannetd europdennes, 343 R.M.C. 3(89 1991.
,1. See Council Resolution, OJ 1982 C179/1.
i1 See Directive 91/439, related to driving license, OJ 1991 L237/1.
11 Vide A. Mangas Martin, "La ciudadanla de la Uni6n Europea", in El Defensor del
Pueblo en el Tratado de la Uni6n Europea, Jomadas celebradas los dfa! y 3 de noviembre de
1992; C~tedra J. Ruiz-Gimnez de estudios sobre elDefensor del Pueblo, Madrid: Universidad
Carlos II1, 1993, p. 1568, specially pages 19-20 and 3233.
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1. Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside
freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the
limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures
adopted to give it effect.
2. The Council may adopt provisions with a view to facilitating the
exercise of the rights referred to in paragraph 1; save as otherwise
provided in this Treaty, the Council shall act in accordance with the
procedure referred to in Article 251. The Council shall act unanimously
throughout this procedure.
It is obligatory to start stating the reiteration of two rights existing in
the Community sphere since its origins. The TEU has made quite more precise
the enjoyment of these rights, but it does not establish new ones, though it sets a
constitutional link between these rights and the citizenship of the Union, what
enhances its situation. Freedom of movement and residence of persons is one of
the basic freedoms in which the Treaties of Rome are based.
Regarding the institutional action, it has to be pointed out, since the
beginning, the attempts of the Commission to create a single regulation of this
subject. As it is conscious of the exclusion of some categories in the ECT, the
Commission proposed a single directive where a generalized right to free
movement were recognized, a directive that also were in benefit of those
nationals excluded when putting in practice the adequate articles of the
Treaty. 116 However, the Council, perhaps trying not to separate from the logic
that inspired those texts from the beginning, did not give way to this point,
despite the recommendations of the Addonino Committee, 117 and it kept on
joining the freedom of movement and residence with the exercise of an
economic activity. So, the Council did not recognize a generalized freedom of
movement and residence depending only on the status of Community national.
In 1989 the Commission retired its proposal and presented three different
projects of directives, considering economic criteria, which were in favor of a
generalized freedom of movement and residence for self employed persons and
retired wage earners, as well as for students. 1 18 Finally, in 1990, the Council
passed three decisive directives on this subject, what fulfilled in a high degree
the Commission's proposals. 119 The only restrictive criterion in the directives
116 See directive proposal from the Commission to the Council of July 1979, related to
the Member State national's right of residence within another Member State's territory, COM
(79) 215 final, published in JOCE C 207, 8/17/1979, p. 14 and modified 61611985#ee
Steinhouser v. City of Biarritz, OJ 1985 C171/4.
17 See EC Bulletin, Supp. OJ 1985 C175/276. (In its second report, june 1985, A
people's Europe, the Addonino Committee had stated that "the right of a citizen of a Member
State of the Community to reside in any other Member State of his free choice is an element of
the right to freedom of movement", reason why it was proposed that the European Council
shall adopt a principle decision recognizing the generalized right to freedom of residence for
all the citizens of the Community). Vide EC Bulletin, Supl. 7/85, p. 14.
118 See Amended Porposal For a Council Directive on the Right of Residence for
Students, OJ 1990 C26/15.
19 See Council Directive, OJ 1990 L180/26; Council Directive OJ 1990 L180/28.
(Related to the right to residence); Council Directive, OJ 1990 L180/28. (Related to the right to
residence of wage-earning workers and retired selfemployed persons.); Council Directive OJ
1990 L180/30. (Related to the right to residence of students. The last directive has been denied
by the Court in case 295/90, European Parliament v. Council of th- European Communities,
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has an economic nature: the beneficiaries must previously prove that they have
the sufficient economic resources for not become a burden for the Social
Security of the residence State. Restrictions, though there are not so many, keep
on basing on the future or past economic status of the beneficiary. On the other
hand, still continues the necessity to get a residence permit renewable every five
years.
In this situation, article 18 supposes an important breach with the
traditional conception of these two freedoms, as it stands for, at least
theoretically, a generalized right for freedom of movement and residence in
favor of Community citizens. That means that, in first place, the economic
dimension of both rights is left aside to make them depend exclusively on the
political status of its titular, that is, having the condition of citizen of the Union.
In second place, and as a direct consequence, the personal sphere of actuation is
amplified and generalized.] 2 0
However, once established these rights, the problem is in the remain of
some limitations to them. So, if, on one hand, the terms of the first paragraph
are categorical in the subject of the establishment for every citizen, of the right
to move and reside freely, just after, in the second paragraph, the submission to
the limits established in the treaties and in derived law is explained. That is, the
limits of article 39.3 ECT related to public policy, public security and public
health, as well as the conditions imposed by the tree directives of 1990 related
to the economic resources, to the illness insurance and to the period of stay,
would be applicable to this new provision of primary law. It is difficult to
conciliate a general proclamation with an important series of limitations. Thus,
we could wonder if the establishment of the inherent guarantees of the right to
freedom of movement and residence, after their inclusion in a constitutional
text, questions the restrictive conditions imposed by these provisions of
secondary law as regarding its enjoyment. However, it seems that restrictions
related to the period of the stay shall be abolished because they affect the
substance of the right to reside freely in another Member State. 12 1 However, as
the limitations of articles 39.3 and 45 ECT are still enforced, according to the
terms of article 18 ECT, and according to case law of the ECJ, there will be
1992 E.C.R. 1-4193). (Although its effects will be applied until the enforcement of a new
directive on this subject, what shall happen after the adoption of Council Directive OJ 1993
L317159.seeA.C. Evans, Nationality Law and European Integration, 16 E.L.R. 190215 1991.
(A general comment of the three directives related to citizenship).
120 See Amended Porposal For a Council Directive on the Right of Residence for
Students, OJ 1990 C26/85. (A clear wish in the project ofracle X4 of the Commission, that
said that this right would be recognized "no matter if they carry out or not an economic
activity"); see Trevor C. Hartley, Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht
Agreement, 42 I.C.L.Q. 213-237 1993. (The main effect of the consecration as a generalized
right, even if it is subject to the same previous limitations and conditions).
21 See id. at article 6.1. (The Spanish proposal on citizenship was in this sense, as it
said: "I. Every citizen of the Unionhas the right to move and resided freely and without time
restrictions in the territory of the Union".. The Commission shared the same opinion, since it
established in article X4: "1. Every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely
and without time restrictions in the territory of the Union, no matter if the carry out or not an
economic activity."), see id. at 85.. (However, this will to insist on the abolition of time
limitations for residence was not included in any of the two proposals, where this article has
always had the redaction included in the TEEC).
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differences between the own nationals and those from another Member State
related to the enjoyment of these rights. Or, at least, there will be differences in
relation to the possibility that the shelter Member State has to expel a
Community national under those restrictions, a measure that can be adopted in
no case against its own nationals. 122
Conclusion
The permanence of a series of restrictions and not of others has been
explained by the different nature of the instrument that establishes them. As
conditions imposed by articles 19 and 43 TEEC are in a Treaty and,
consequently, are part of primary law, they have primacy on the norms of
derived law adopted to make easier its application. That is the reason why it is
said that restrictions in derived law shall be repealed, as far as they are not
compatible with these rights. 12 3 On the other hand, if the Treaty introduces a
result obligation, the Court could judge the compatibility of the measures
adopted to make easier the application of those rights with their content, and the
Court will even be able to repeal them. 12 4
What seems obvious, after these considerations, is that the TEU is also
far away from the recognition of a really generalized right of residence and
movement, such as the Court12 5 has recently said. That has been stated by the
maximum jurisdictional institution of the Community with the denial, so far and
despite the referred conventional provisions, of the existence of a right to
freedom of movement and residence in any of the Community States. Thus, our
first premise, the disappear of nationals borders, is still, in a high degree, an
illusion and a handicap for a real integration of Europe's peoples.
1' See Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. at 1352;see Joined Cases
115 and 116/81 and Adoui v. Belgian State and City of Leige, Comuaille v. Belgian State,
1982 E.C.R. 1665 1707-1708 and 1708-1709.
t23 See VERGtS, Droits fondamentaux et droits, cit. supra, p. 89; LIIqAN
NOGUERAS, De ]a ciudadania. . ., cit. supra, p. 86, who understands that article 46.1 TEEC
restrictions will be only to continue enforced, that is, restditions based on public policy, public
security and public health, but only related to nationals from third States.
124 See id.
123 See Case 378/97, Criminal Proceedings Against Wijsenbeek, 1999, E.C.R.-6207.
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